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Introduction 
 
In various texts Leibniz advances the view that true religion is founded on reason and is 
thus universal, that is, available to all human beings qua rational creatures. In one text, for 
example, he claims that “God already revealed true religion to men through the light of nature ... 
even before the Mosaic law was given,”2 and in another that 
 
we could very well establish the truth of religion, and end many of the controversies which divide men and cause so 
many problems for the human race, if we were to meditate with order and proceed as we ought.
3
 
 
We could term the idea that Leibniz advances here his doctrine of “universal rational religion,” a 
religion derived from reason and hence accessible to all, Christians and non-Christians alike, by 
virtue of the universality of reason. Leibniz’s preferred term for it was, of course, natural 
theology. 
 As a lifelong Christian, Leibniz’s obviously did not consider his notion of a universal 
rational religion to be in any way incompatible with Christianity, in fact quite the opposite: if 
anything, Leibniz saw the two as complementary.
4
 Nevertheless, he acknowledged differences in 
terms of their respective contents, and these were such that it would not be unfair to describe 
Leibnizian natural theology as “Christianity-lite,” that is, as a pared-down version of 
Christianity. Consequently, what one would find in natural theology was the truth, but not the 
whole truth,
5
 as it lacked some of the core doctrines of Christianity (as determined by scripture 
and tradition).
 6
 Notably absent from Leibniz’s natural theology, for example, were the Christian 
mysteries of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection of the Dead. Throughout his career 
Leibniz held that reason is unable to demonstrate the truth of the Christian mysteries, only their 
possibility; in his favoured terminology the mysteries are above reason (in that reason cannot 
demonstrate their truth) but not against reason (in that it can show that they are not inherently 
contradictory).
7
 Needless to say, by virtue of being above reason the mysteries cannot form part 
of Leibniz’s natural theology.8 Nevertheless, Leibniz held that natural theology captured the 
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essence of Christianity, or at least enough of it to bring about a genuine love of God above all 
things,
 9
 which Leibniz sometimes considered to be sufficient for salvation.
10
 
 I have two aims in this paper. The first is to map the terrain of Leibniz’s universal 
rational religion, that is, identify some of the key theological truths and doctrines that Leibniz 
believed could be reached via reason, and as such would be accessible to non-Christians. As we 
shall see, while Leibniz held that there were a number of theological truths and doctrines that 
were potentially available to all, he also acknowledged that non-Christians had enjoyed very 
limited success in reaching them. Identifying Leibniz’s explanation for this will be my second 
aim. 
 
Natural theology 
 
Traditionally, natural theology has been considered to be the investigation into the divine 
based on reason and experience rather than revelation.
11
 Ever since Hume and Paley we have 
come to construe natural theology even more narrowly, as what Kant termed physico-theology, 
that is, the attempt to uncover evidence of (divine) design in the features of the world, 
specifically in its order and beauty. While there are passages in Leibniz’s corpus in which he 
seems to endorse such a practice,
12
 it is not what he understands by natural theology. At times 
Leibniz seems to equate natural theology with metaphysics,
13
 which by its nature is practiced 
through rational rather than empirical means. Consequently, it is no surprise that when Leibniz 
defines natural theology he routinely does so in terms of reason rather than experience.
14
 His 
most revealing definition can be found in a lecture from 1714, in which he writes: “Natural 
theology is that which, like all the other sciences, originates from the seeds of truth embedded in 
the mind by God, their author.”15 So characterized, Leibniz’s understanding of “natural 
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theology” is far removed from that of most of its other proponents. Its inherently rational nature 
for Leibniz is confirmed by his reference to “the seeds of truth embedded in the mind by God,” 
which thus roots it squarely in his doctrine of innate ideas. In brief, innate ideas are those that are 
in every person’s mind from the outset, albeit virtually or potentially; they can be brought to 
consciousness by reflection on one’s own mind and its features.16 For example, Leibniz 
considers the idea of substance to be innate because each of us is a substance – a fact that each 
person can recognize through reflection on his own nature.
17
 Leibniz recognises a number of 
ideas as innate in this sense, for example “Being, Unity, Substance, Duration, Change, Action, 
Perception, Pleasure” and so on.18 But more important than any of these, at least from the 
perspective of natural theology, is the idea of God, which according to Leibniz is also innate.
19
 
But what does it mean to say that idea of God is innate? In one of the appendices to the Theodicy 
Leibniz explains that “the idea of God is in the idea of ourselves through the suppression of the 
limits of our perfections.”20 In other words, in the course of reflecting on our own natural 
limitations (e.g. the fact that we do not know everything and cannot do anything we want to), we 
can suppose these limitations removed to thus reveal the idea of God, i.e. the idea of an 
absolutely perfect being, one without limitations. (This is so because in Leibniz’s view the 
infinite, or absolute, is anterior to the finite, or the limited.
21
 So the idea of oneself as a being of 
limited perfection is in fact a complex idea made up of the idea of infinite or absolute perfection, 
and the idea of negation or limitation; to arrive at the idea of an absolutely perfect being one 
need only remove the idea of negation or limitation from the idea of oneself as a being with 
limited perfections.) 
 Through internal reflection the idea of God is thus available to all, even those who have 
not had the benefit of Christian revelation. As if to clinch the point, Leibniz repeatedly claims 
that the concept of God endorsed by Christians – that of the most perfect being or substance – is 
also to be found in various pre-Christian thinkers such as the Pythagoreans and the Platonists.
22
 
He also goes to great lengths to defend the suggestion that the idea of God is to be found in 
ancient Chinese writings,
23
 though he does acknowledge that some cultures have no notion of 
God at all.
24
 Nevertheless, the idea is available to all by virtue of being innate, that is, available 
through reflection on ourselves. 
Now as we have seen, Leibniz claims that natural theology originates in the “seeds of 
truth embedded in the mind by God”;25 it does not end there, however. Leibnizian natural 
theology has two parts, or sides. The first we have considered already, namely the discovery 
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within ourselves of the idea of God, as well as other ideas central to theology, such as that of 
soul.
26
 The second aspect of natural theology might more accurately be termed rational theology, 
as it involves the derivation of various theological truths and doctrines through a very formal 
process of (largely deductive) proofs and conceptual analysis. In what follows I will briefly run 
through some of the fruits of the analytic/deductive side of Leibniz’s universal rational religion. 
 One claim that Leibniz makes often is that God’s existence can be known “by the natural 
light,” that is, by the powers of reason alone. Over the course of his career Leibniz identified a 
number of ways in which reason can disclose God’s existence. A commonly revisited one begins 
with the notion of God as an absolutely perfect being (a notion which of course is innate), and 
then moves to a recognition that, as existence is a perfection, God (qua absolutely perfect being) 
must exist.
27
 Variations involve the claim that God’s essence necessarily involves existence, or 
that as “being from itself” God necessarily must exist.28 Since the time of Kant such arguments 
have of course been known as forms of the so-called “ontological argument.” 
 In addition to teaching us of God’s existence, Leibniz holds that natural theology also 
enables us to grasp many things about God’s nature, e.g. that he is one, and good, and wise: 
“we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a sole Principle of all things, 
entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this by infallible proofs.”29 Claims like these are 
familiar ones, and are to be found throughout Leibniz’s corpus, though some texts treat them 
in greater depth than others. One of lengthier texts dealing with God’s nature is “Rationale of 
the Catholic Faith,” from 1685.30 In this piece, Leibniz starts with the notion of God as the 
most perfect substance and then proceeds to draw out a series of consequences of this, such as 
that God exists, that he is eternal, unique, incorporeal, a mind, and omniscient, omnipotent, 
good and just. All of these properties/attributes are discoverable by unpacking the definition 
of God as the most perfect substance. The text ends with the further demonstrations that 
God’s foreknowledge is compatible with human free will, that God is not the cause of sin, and 
that our misery cannot be imputed to him. All of this takes place in about 7 pages of printed 
text! To put this in perspective, when Christian Wolff treated the same topics (as well as 
others that Leibniz identified as part of natural theology), his painstakingly detailed discussion 
spanned almost two thousand pages over two volumes.
31
  Leibniz could only dream of such a 
systematic treatment. Instead he often made do with making condensed statements like this 
one: 
 
It is evident by the natural light that there exists some most perfect substance, which we call God, and evident in the 
same way that he is unique, necessary, i.e. eternal... It also follows that God is an omnipotent and omniscient mind, 
and that all things are arranged by him in the best way, such that it cannot be better.
32
 
 
The claim that one can deduce from God’s nature that this must be the best possible world is one 
encountered often in Leibniz’s youthful and “middle period” writings, e.g.: 
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Given the most perfect being, namely God…, that the most perfect operation is that of the most perfect being, and 
that the world is the work of God, then the world is the most perfect, and hence no other series of things can be 
imagined which is more perfect than this one.
33
 
 
In later writings, Leibniz tended to draw back from the claim that reason could 
demonstrate that this world is the best one possible, arguing that one could not deduce from 
God’s perfect nature that he would choose the best, as his choice was a free one.34 Nevertheless 
Leibniz did not seem to think that reason’s wings were clipped too much by this, as he continued 
to maintain, amongst other things, that “God wills the best through his own nature,”35 “as his 
perfection requires of him,”36 and that God’s will “is indefectible and always tends towards the 
best.”37 And indeed, Leibniz consistently treated his doctrine that this is the best of all possible 
worlds as something that reason can disclose, and so as part of natural theology. 
 In the Theodicy Leibniz identifies another question that falls within the purview of 
natural theology, namely that of how God could permit the good to suffer, or indeed permit the 
existence of evil at all.
38
 One can in fact see the Theodicy as a long, rambling attempt to answer 
such questions and so to justify God in the face of the world’s evil. In nuce, Leibniz’s argument 
is that from God’s immense wisdom, power and goodness we can infer that the evils there are in 
this world had to be permitted because God would have eradicated them if he could have done. 
We can know, then, that such evils form part of the best scheme (or are bound up with greater 
goods), since God permitted them. The question of how specific evils form part of the best 
scheme (or are bound up with greater goods) lies outside the domain of natural theology, 
however, there being no way anyone can analyse or deduce his way to the correct answer.
39
 
 Let us now switch our attention away from the universe as a whole and turn it to the 
individuals within it, or the individual rational beings anyway. According to Leibniz, just as it 
follows from God’s nature that he has acted most perfectly with regard to the world as a whole, it 
also follows that he acts perfectly with regard to the individuals within it. And hence, being 
perfectly good and wise (and hence perfectly just), it follows that God will ensure perfect justice 
is maintained. What this means is that every good deed will be rewarded and every sin punished, 
whether this happen in this life or not.
40
 Indeed, Leibniz even suggests that temporal post-
mortem punishment (the cornerstone of the Catholic doctrine of purgatory) can be demonstrated 
rationally.
41
 
Of course natural theology cannot establish the peculiarly Christian doctrines of the 
beatific vision, or Hell, these belonging squarely to the domain of revealed theology, but Leibniz 
holds that reason can at least disclose the soul’s immortality. (And this is also part of Leibnizian 
natural theology which, he states, “treats of immaterial substances, and particularly of God and 
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the soul.”)42 Leibniz’s rational proof of the immortality of the soul starts by establishing the 
soul’s immateriality. In various writings he argues that the soul cannot be material because 
material things have parts, whereas the soul does not; it is a unity, i.e. something that is one.
43
 
Since the soul is not material, it must be immaterial. And in Leibniz’s view, the natural 
immortality of souls follows from their immateriality, for as souls are without parts (qua unity) 
they cannot be destroyed by dissolution.
44
 Although these arguments are undoubtedly those 
favoured by Leibniz, he was not dismissive of other efforts to demonstrate by reason the 
immateriality and immortality of the soul, and often singled out for praise Plato’s efforts in the 
Phaedo.
45
 
To summarise our brief excursion through Leibniz’s universal rational religion, Leibniz 
holds that by virtue of natural theology one can have the idea of God, as well as establish the 
existence of God, the nature of God, his perfect action in relation to the world and to us, his 
administering of reward to the virtuous and punishment to the wicked, and the fact that our souls 
are immaterial and immortal 
 
The Limits of Reason in the domain of Theology 
 
Given the richness and scope of Leibniz’s natural theology one might expect him to hold 
that revelation was unnecessary, as all the important theological truths and doctrines could be 
attained by anyone simply by using the faculty of reason. It is certainly possible to see evidence 
of this kind of thinking in Leibniz’s work, but it is rarely given the kind of stress we might 
expect given his portrayal as an arch-rationalist. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly due to 
his acknowledgment that although the well of natural theology runs deep, few have drunk deeply 
from it. As we have seen, Leibniz makes much of those who have successfully happened upon 
“correct” theological doctrines by a judicious use of reason.46 But he does not fail to 
acknowledge counter-examples, for example those pagans who have arrived at an erroneous 
notion of God as being the whole world or the soul of the world.
47
 As he notes, some pagans 
have even taken God to be the sun and the moon, which could only happen by virtue of a 
spectacular failure to grasp the fact that God is incorporeal.
48
 Other commonly-cited examples of 
faulty pagan natural theology are Pythagoras’ doctrine of transmigration and the denial of the 
immateriality and (hence) natural immortality of the soul by the ancient Atomists. But even 
Christian thinkers do not have an unblemished track record in the field of natural theology; recall 
Leibniz’s famous (and tactless) remark to the Princess of Wales that natural religion is very 
much in decline in England because many there “will have human souls to be material; others 
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make God himself a corporeal being.”49 Even the pagan thinker most admired by Leibniz, 
namely Plato, fell short of achieving all that Leibniz thought possible in natural theology. 
Given the acknowledged lack of human achievement in the field of natural theology, it is 
not surprising to find Leibniz stating very explicitly, and very often, that in practice revelation 
was necessary. But the puzzle is: why has there been such a lack of success in natural theology 
when every single human has the one tool required (viz. reason) for its successful practice? 
Leibniz offers a number of explanations, though as we shall see these are all in turn explained by 
a doctrine peculiar to Christianity. 
In a text from the mid-1680s Leibniz writes: 
 
There was a need for revelation not only in order that we might acquire knowledge of those things which reason 
cannot teach, but also in order that men who are insufficiently influenced by arguments alone might be moved by 
religion.
50
 
 
(By “things which reason cannot teach” Leibniz is undoubtedly thinking of the Christian 
mysteries – such as the Trinity and the Incarnation – which reason is incapable of divulging.51) 
For our purposes, the important claim here is that some men are insufficiently moved by 
arguments. As it turns out, Leibniz thinks this problem is widespread. As he states in a letter to 
Electress Sophie, “We must acknowledge that revelation was necessary: reason on its own, 
without authority, will never make an impression on the common run of men.”52 Reason’s 
inability to reach, touch and inspire men is a common theme in Leibniz’s theological writings, 
and is behind his frequent exhortations to present theological doctrines in more “edifying” 
mediums such as music and poetry.
53
 The problem, according to his diagnosis, is that purely 
rational demonstrations are difficult for us because they do not involve the senses or the 
imagination.
54
 
 As it happens, this is not the only problem. For Leibniz informs us that 
 
Even if there were neither public revelation nor scripture, men, following the internal natural lights (that is, reason), 
to which the assistance of the light of the Holy Spirit would not be lacking if needed, would not fail to attain true 
beatitude. But as men misuse their reason, the public revelation of the Messiah has been made necessary.
55
 
 
Leibniz does not say how men misuse reason, though on the basis of other texts it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that, whatever such misuse involves, it is ultimately due to the 
corruptions of men: 
 
Experience has shown that the corruption of men is so great that reason alone cannot be enough for them, and so 
there was a need for particular grace and divine revelation.
56
 
 
The religion of reason is eternal, and God engraved it into our hearts, our corruptions obscured it, and the goal of 
Jesus Christ was to restore its luster, to bring men back to the true knowledge of God and the soul, and to make them 
practice the virtue which constitutes true happiness.
57
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If we suppose, as is reasonable, that the “corruption” referred to here is that of original sin, then 
Leibniz appears to be saying that the fall of Adam and Eve has introduced disorders into our 
constitution, which deleteriously affects our ability to reason.
58
 And this does indeed seem to be 
his position, for he asserts that on account of original sin, men’s “understanding is obscured and 
their senses have more influence,”59 as a result of which, our reasoning “is mixed with prejudices 
and passions.”60 Original sin thus explains the difficulty experienced by men in constructing and 
following rational demonstrations, as well as their liability to “misuse” reason (by failing to use 
it without prejudice and emotion). There is, then, an ultimate irony at the heart of Leibniz’s 
doctrine of natural theology, in that the reason for mankind’s general failure in the practice of 
natural theology is to be found in a key doctrine of revealed theology. 
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